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Roadmap to Illinois Class Actions
LEROY J. TORNQUIST*
Although the class action has existed as a litigation device for
over two hundred years, the Illinois case law governing such ac-
tions in state courts is unsettled. Illinois, to date, has no statute
or rule of procedure to govern class actions comparable to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Consequently, recent increases
in the use of class actions within the state have generated pro-
cedural problems without precedent. Professor Tornquist exam-
ines many of the basic procedural questions to be encountered by
the attorney who prosecutes or defends an Illinois class action.
They include issues of jurisdiction, venue, pleading, discovery, set-
tlement, notice, trial and appeal as such matters uniquely relate to
the class action. He concludes by suggesting that the Illinois Su-
preme Court or General Assembly adopt a statute or rule to gov-
ern such cases and that it be incorporated in the state's relatively
modern code of civil procedure.
Historically, class actions originated in the 18th and 19th century
practice of England.' They were adopted by equity courts to avoid the
technical requirements of the law courts that all persons who may be
affected by a judgment be named as parties and be given notice.2 Even
though class actions have existed for centuries, their relative importance
has increased recently in all jurisdictions due to the increased awareness
* B.S., Northwestern University (1962); J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law (1965); Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1. Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676); City of London
V. Perkins, 3 Bro. P.C. 539, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (1734); Chancey v. May, 24 Eng. Rep.
265 (1722).
2. For an analysis of the development of class actions see South East Nat. Bank
v. Board of Education, 298 11. App. 92, 18 N.E.2d 584 (1938), quoting at length
from J. STORY, EQurrY PLEADINGS (9th ed. 1918).
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of consumer-minded groups concerning enforcement of their legal
remedies through the use of class actions.3 They have "sprouted and
multiplied like the leaves of a green bay tree."'4 Today the class action
is available in every jurisdiction in one form or another.
The increased use of class actions has created difficulties because
the courts are not equipped to handle the procedural complexities of
the class action. This is particularly true in Illinois where common law
equity rules and precedents determine the propriety of class actions.
Although there are many Illinois decisions which deal with the issue of
whether or not a class action should be allowed, they are not consistent
in that determination. 5 Furthermore, they shed little light on the speci-
fic procedural problems which must be considered by an attorney such
as pleading, notice to the class, intervention, jurisdiction of the subject
matter and parties, venue, discovery, settlement, trial and appealability.
It is the purpose of this article to present some of the basic problems
encountered by an attorney who prosecutes or defends against a class
action in Illinois.
POLICY REASONS FOR AND AGAINST CLASS ACTIONS
Policy reasons for or against allowing the class action are particularly
important because the Illinois courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether or not to permit such an action. How the courts interpret
the nebulous standards for maintaining a class action depends in part
upon how effectively counsel can argue policy. Following are some of
the policy reasons for allowing or refusing to allow a class action to be
maintained.
There are several reasons why class actions are difficult to sustain in
Illinois. First is the reluctance of the courts to tamper with the historic
common law principle that a defendant is not bound by an in person-
am judgment rendered in a suit in which he is not designated as a
party and as to which he has not been personally served with pro-
cess. 6 Since the final decree in a class action binds all plaintiffs, ap-
pearing in person or by representation, it must follow that the decree
3. E.g., STARRS, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS, HANDBOOK ON CONSUMER LAW (1968);
Comment, 114 U. PA. L. RPEV. 395 (1966); Klaven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941).
4. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir. May
1, 1973), cert. granted, 42 U-S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
5. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 11. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731
(1962).
6. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 IlI. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37
(1939).
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is res judicata as to all members of the class." Even though class ac-
tions developed in the equity courts to circumvent the requirement
of naming all plaintiffs as parties and notifying them, courts think of it
as an unusual procedural device. The burden is on the representa-
tive to show substantial benefits to the litigants and the court before
a class action is justified.'
Another factor influencing courts to limit class action suits, although
not often articulated, is that they are by their nature time consuming
and difficult to manage. Because of such unmanageability, many fed-
eral cases have been dismissed or the scope of the class has been signi-
ficantly reduced.9 For example, some courts have been reluctant to
undertake the "harrowing experience"'10 of a class action and have noted
the "unusual burdens upon an already overburdened federal court sys-
tem"" and the "sizeable judicial resources"12 consumed by them. This
problem is aggravated in Illinois, where there is no statute or Supreme
Court Rule to guide the courts in administering the action. The deci-
sions are numerous and conflicting.'1
Another reason for dismissing a class action is that an analysis of a
plaintiff's claim may disclose that a recovery is directed to the plaintiff's
lawyer's profit rather than to the plaintiff's own interest or to the class
he has elected himself to represent. It is acknowledged that fees in a
class action may be extremely large.' 4 In a dissenting opinion one fed-
eral judge has stated:
Obviously the only persons to gain from a class suit are not po-
tential plaintiffs, but the attorneys who will represent them.' 5
This reasoning, in my opinion, is ill-founded. The philosophy of class
7. Groves v. Farmers State Bank, 368 Ill. 35, 12 N.E.2d 618 (1937); Leonard
v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197 N.E. 546 (1935).
8. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971).
9. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir. May
1, 1973) ("Eisen III"), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973); City
of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); United Egg Products
v. Bauer International Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hackett v. General
Host Corp., Civil No. 70-364 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
10. Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
11. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 542 (8th Cir. 1972).
12. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 108, 180 N.E.2d 731,
735 (1962).
14. E.g., in Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964), a
taxpayer class action, the fund created was $811,950.00 and the fees allowed were
$249,957.82; in F. Monroe Cigar v. City of Chicago, No. 62S 12533 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty.
1962), a license fee case, the fund was $829,062.00 and the fees allowed were $258,-
688.06.
15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lombard, C.J.,
dissenting).. See also Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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actions, like the adversary system in general, is based on self-interest
as the motivating force. One is more likely to help his fellowman if by
doing so he helps himself. The class action is an attempt to use man's
natural instinct to act in his own self-interest in order to achieve justice
and procedural efficiency in mass litigation. To provide representation
which is in the best interest of the class, it is necessary to compensate the
attorneys for their professional legal services. In effect the named plain-
tiffs and their attorneys are assuming the position of a "private attorney
general." They will only be compensated if successful, and the award of
attorney's fees will rest in the discretion of the court. The court has the
burden of protecting the unnamed members of the class from unreason-
able fees.
There are several reasons for expanding the use of class actions in
Illinois. First, the class action relieves plaintiffs from the rule of com-
pulsory joinder where joinder is impracticable. Although the joinder
provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act have been relaxed, there re-
main situations where non-joinder will lead to dismissal of an action.' 6
The number of parties may make joinder impracticable or joinder of
parties may be impossible if one of the necessary parties is unborn or
out of the jurisdiction. Even if joinder of a large group is accom-
plished at great time and expense, death of a party may result in abate-
ment and prevent or delay rendering of the decree.' 7 In order to main-
tain the class action, plaintiff will have to show that it is impractical to
join all parties.
Second, class actions avoid the multiplicity of lawsuits which would
arise if each member of the class filed a separate claim against the same
defendant. Therefore, class actions protect the defendant from multi-
ple claims and the judicial system from overwork. Furthermore, there
is a basic fairness in obtaining a consistent determination on a question
affecting persons having a similar legal situation in a particular forum.
Critics reply that class suits create more work for the court system be-
cause they result in claims which would not otherwise be pursued.
Furthermore, the tremendous amount of judicial time required to man-
age even one class suit is well-acknowledged.' 8
Third, with today's complex financial and commercial transactions,
individuals may not be aware of violations of their rights. Diligent in-
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26 (1971).
17. See Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit under the Federal Rules and in
Illinois, 42 Nw. U.L. REV. 518, 519 (1947).
18. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir. May
1, 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
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dividuals who file the class action would in effect protect the rights
of the less diligent and less informed.
Fourth, in many cases the dollar value of a valid claim may not jus-
tify an individual's payment of the non-taxable costs of a legal ac-
tion, but the value of many individual claims would allow claimants to
share the non-taxable costs and risks of litigation. In addition, the
magnitude of a class action, as opposed to that of an individual claim,
would encourage a lawyer to take a case on a contingent basis because
of the possibility of a large recovery and consequently large fees. In
short, absence of a class action procedure would prevent many indi-
viduals from seeking legal redress of a valid claim because the claim,
and thus the fee, is too small.
Fifth, a class action although civil in nature may have a deterrent
effect upon a potential wrongdoer because of the sobering thought of
a large verdict on behalf of all who have been wronged.
WHAT Is AN ILLINOIS CLASS ACTION?
A class action is a suit by one or more plaintiffs on behalf of a class
of individuals who have common rights. All members of the class are
before the court by representation. The terms "representative suit"
and "class suit" as applied thereto are used interchangeably. Generally,
the word "representative" refers to the named individuals bringing the
action while the word "class" embraces the entire group which the
named persons purport to represent.
It is well settled that plaintiffs may maintain a class action in Illi-
nois. I° However, the matter of what constitutes a valid class action in
Illinois is governed by common law equity rules and precedents,"0
and the shaping of that law has been a slow process, in contrast to
the situation in states that have adopted class action statutes.
Therefore, questions of first impression are more likely to ap-
pear in Illinois. When they do, an attorney must look outside Illinois
and use authority from other jurisdictions. Fortunately, the federal
19. Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Il1. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
It is doubtful whether a suit may be brought against defendants as a class in Illinois.
In Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 Ill. App. 191, 196, 106 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1952), the
court stated that "there is no authority for an action at law against a defendant in
a representative capacity." However, language is contained in at least one case ap-
proving such an action. City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 452, 51 N.E. 907,
908 (1898), approved in Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 588,
195 N.E. 420, 422 (1935); Cox v. Shupe, 41 111. App. 2d 413, 191 N.E.2d 250 (1963).
Cf. Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
20. An exception is found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1971), which relates
to procedures whereby a class action is compromised or dismissed.
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courts have wrestled with many of the procedural difficulties and
frustrations which have not yet been presented to the Illinois courts.
Many of the federal cases deal with constitutional issues raised by all
class actions. 2' Some of the cases deal with jurisdictional issues which
vitally concern the Illinois lawyer who seeks a federal forum.2" Fur-
thermore, although not directly applicable, the reasoning contained in
the federal cases interpreting the class action provision in Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may serve as a guideline to inter-
pretation of llniois problems. Therefore, I will refer to federal cases
when they are applicable to Illinois class actions by analogy or when
the federal courts provide a viable alternative forum.
MAY THE CLASS ACTION BE MAINTAINED?
Before an action is filed, an attorney must analyze the facts to deter-
mine whether a class action may be maintained, and if so, who should
constitute the class.
If there is only a small group, the attorney may decide to attempt
joinder of all the individuals as plaintiffs. If the prospective class is
too large, the representatives and members of the class may not have a
common interest in the subject matter of the suit or the remedy, and
the action will be dismissed. Then what does constitute a valid class
action? To sustain a class action the number of the aggrieved parties
must be so great that it is impracticable to join them as parties, and the
representative and members of the class must have a common interest in
the subject matter of the suit and a common interest in the remedy.24 In
addition, most Illinois courts have required a "common fund,"25 and an
equitable cause of action.26  These requirements will be discussed later
in this article.
21. E.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d
37 (1939).
22. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
23. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23. In fact, Illinois courts do look to Rule 23 and decisions
interpreting it. See Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Company, No. 68 Ch. 275 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Cty. March 11, 1969). See also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800,
484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971), where the California Supreme Court
indicated that in the event of a hiatus, Rule 23 prescribes procedural devices which
a trial court may find useful.
24. Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Il. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958); John-
son v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257, 108 N.E.2d 429 (1952); Smyth v. Kaspar American State
Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956); Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. App.
135, 35 N.E.2d 545 (1941); State Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 301,
68 N.E.2d 525 (1946); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See Comment, 4 J.
MARSHALL, J. PRAC. AND PROCED. 218 (1971), which analyzes the common interest
rule.
25. See Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968); Fio-
rito v. Jones, 39 IlL 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v.
Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959).
26. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Schreiber, 382 Ill. 454, 47 N.E.2d 462 (1943).
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The court in Moseid v. McDonough refined the common interest test
by establishing additional standards:
Factors to be considered in applying this test are: Whether the
claims of all members of the class share a common question of
law and fact, such as the existence of a common fund from which
relief can be given (Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 483,
486, 101 NE2d 617; Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 111. App.
135, 160, 35 NE2d 545); whether the causes of action of the
members of the class arise from the same transaction (Peoples
Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 154, 39 NE2d
995; Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 2d 226, 236, 43
NE2d 939); whether one party can adequately represent the
rights and interests of all other members of the purported class
(Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Il. 85, 90, 55
NE2d 147); whether the number of possible class members ren-
ders separate litigation impossible or impractical (South East Na-
tional Bank of Chicago v. Board of Education, 298 Ill. App.
92, 114, 18 NE2d 584); and whether there exists a purely equi-
table cause of action (Fetherston v. National Republic Bancor-
poration, 280 l. App. 151, 160).27
Another independent requisite of class actions is that their entire pro-
cedure must meet the requirements of due process of law under the
state and federal constitutions. This is particularly significant in class
actions because absent members of the class may be bound by the re-
sult of the lawsuit even though they are not designated as parties and
have not been served with process. Therefore, constitutional ques-
tions concerning proper notice to the absent class members, personal
jurisdiction, and adequacy of representation may arise. These sub-
jects will also be discussed subsequently.
The Illinois decisions determining when a class action may be main-
tained are conflicting. 28 Following is a discussion of some of the areas
of uncertainty.
Is A Common Fund Required?
A common fund is a fund from which the members of the class
could recover. There is a question whether a "common fund" is re-
quired to maintain a class action where monetary relief is requested.
In Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, the court dismissed a
class action on behalf of certain sellers of goods to recover improperly
collected sales taxes on the ground, among others, that there was no
27. 103 Il. App. 2d 23, 27-28, 243 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1968).
28. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731
(1962).
1974
Loyola University Law Journal
"common fund" from which members of the class could recover.29
There, none of the members of the class, with the exception of the
plaintiff, had paid under protest the tax claimed to be illegal. There-
fore, the money had been turned over to the State Treasurer without
restriction and deposited into the general fund of the State of Illinois.
Thus there was no fund in existence. In many subsequent cases in
which class actions have been sustained, the courts have been careful
to point to the existence of a "common fund.""0
However, one Illinois court has indicated that the existence of a com-
mon fund was only a "factor to be considered."'' 3 Furthermore, in
Reardon v. Ford Motor Co.,32 the court denied the right to maintain a
class action, but as dicta stated:
We do not deem it to be mandatory that there be in esse a com-
mon fund in every instance if a class action is to be sustained for
we are aware of the many cases where such an action was per-
mitted in the absence of such a fund.
However, the court distinguished cases which had not required a com-
mon fund and said that here a common fund was required.
In Reardon the court refused to accept the representative's argument
to create a common fund of $5,000,000 from the defendant's general
assets. The court indicated that this would destroy the "common fund"
requirement since one could be created at will from general funds in
all tort and contract actions, and that this was not the intent of the case
law in Illinois.
There are cases in which class actions seeking only injunctive relief
have been upheld in the absence of any "common fund. '3 3  In these
cases no fund was necessary since monetary relief was not requested.
The "common fund" rule severely limits the use of class actions for
money damages by consumers and, as will be pointed out, those claim-
ants will in most cases be unable to obtain federal jurisdiction. In my
opinion the "common fund" doctrine does not serve any useful pur-
pose. Courts of other commercial states have relaxed or eliminated
29. 379 I11. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
30. Fiorito v. Jones, 39 I1. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968); Harrison Sheet Steel
Co. v. Lyons, 15 111. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co.,
17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958); Cook v. Cohn, 25 Il. App. 2d 330; 166
N.E.2d 614 (1960).
31. Moseid v. McDonough, 103 IlL App. 2d 23, 27, 243 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1968).
However, the court was careful to indicate that the statutes created a "County Law
Library Fund."
32. 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 344-45, 287 N.E.2d 519, 524 (1972)
33. City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 I11. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (i898); Johnson v. Halpin,
413 Ill. 257, 108 N.E.2d 429 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Thorpe v. Mahin,
43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969).
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the doctrine.3 4 The federal courts do not require a common fund. 5
Illinois should follow their lead and declare the doctrine dead by judi-
cial decision, statute or court rule.
Community of Interest in the Subject Matter
The application of the community of interest rule to particular facts
has caused considerable difficulty. One basic issue raised in applying
the rule is whether distinct transactions by members of the class with
the defendant destroy the required community of interest in the sub-
ject matter.
For example, Newberry Library v. Board of Education36 involved
a class action on behalf of holders of school bonds to collect unpaid
and overdue interest. The Illinois Supreme Court held that no class
action could be sustained even though the bonds were issued simul-
taneously and were identical in terms because claims of members arose
out of separate and distinct transactions. Defenses such as payment or
settlement of claim might be good against some class members but not
against others. Therefore, there was not a sufficient community of
interest in the subject matter. This, of course, is a persuasive argument
in a case based on fraud and deceit,3" where individual questions of
liability and defense arise in the defense of the allegations of fraud.
Some writers have argued that the Newberry court evidenced
hostility toward class actions as a result of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Hansberry v. Lee 3  which had reversed a decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court.3 9  In any event the Newberry test re-
garding community of interest in the subject matter creates a difficult
hurdle for representatives.
However, it is difficult to reconcile Newberry with subsequent deci-
sions. In Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corporation,4" Kimbrough
v. Parker,41 Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Company,42 and Smyth
34. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967);
Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869 (1966).
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
36. 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
37. Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp., 280 IlL App. 151 (1935); Langson
v. Goldberg, 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940). See also Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015,
1016 (1938), where the opinion is expressed that a class suit in fraud will not lie
under any circumstances.
38. 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
39. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49
BOSTON U.L. REV. 407, 430 (1969); Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit under
the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 Nw. U.L REV. 518 (1947).
40. 34 111. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962).
41. 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
42. No. 68 Ch. 275 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. March 11, 1969).
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v. Kaspar," the courts allowed class actions where there were distinct
transactions with the defendant."
In Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 5 customers of a retailer
brought a class action to recover improperly collected sales taxes. In
reply to defendant's argument that there was not a community of in-
terest in the subject matter, the court said:
The company also contends that there is a possibility that indi-
vidual questions may arise between itself and the members of
the class. But the hypothetical existence of individual issues is
not a sufficient reason to deny the right to bring a class action.
Where it appears that the common issue is dominant and perva-
sive, something more than the assertion of hypothetical variations
of a minor character should be required to bar the action.
Harrison did not overrule any earlier Illinois decision which re-
strictively interpreted and applied the community of interest require-
ment, but it permitted the class action to proceed notwithstanding sep-
arate and distinct transactions with the defendant. The court recog-
nized that the defendant's right to defend against any individual is-
sues will not be impaired and that the defendant cannot contend that it
will suffer any inconvenience by litigating those issues in a single ac-
tion rather than separate actions. The court required a community of
interest, not in every issue of the controversy, but only in the "domi-
nant and pervasive" issue.
Of course, the community of interest in the subject matter could be
destroyed because of a significant difference between the representa-
tive and members of the class created by separate transactions. For
example, if separate transactions in a fraud case created differences in
proof of the fact of a representation, its falsity, and reliance,46 the
action would in effect become multiple lawsuits tried under the guise
of a class action. Each member of the class would then have to es-
tablish his right to recover on the basis of facts peculiar to his own
cricumstances. The purpose of the class action would be defeated.
For this reason the use of a class action is generally prohibited in a
43. Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
44. For decisions from other jurisdictions allowing class actions in situations where
there were considerable variations in the facts relevant to each member of the class,
see Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971);
Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
45. 15 Ill. 2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1959). See also KIaven & Rosen-
field, The Contemporary Function of a Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 684, 694 (1941);
Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit, 42 Nw. U.L. REv. 518 (1947).
46. Whether there must be individual proof of reliance is subject to dispute. Com-
pare Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), with Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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mass tort situation. Therefore, the experience of the federal courts in
handling the mass tort is enlightening.
Use of the Class Action In the Mass Tort
The Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules rejected the idea that a class action is proper where the
action is for a "mass tort" because:
• .. significant questions, not only of damages but of liability
and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individ-
uals in different ways. In these circumstances an action con-
ducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice
into multiple lawsuits separately tried. (Emphasis added.) 47
It is possible that the circumstances of a "mass tort" action would be
such that the issues of liability and defenses would depend on an iden-
tical set of facts for each class member. A class action would be ad-
visable in such a situation.48 For example, in American Trading and
Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,4 9 the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed a class action to pro-
ceed against defendants who were allegedly negligent in construction
and maintenance of electrical wiring in the McCormick Place exposi-
tion center in Chicago. The plaintiff class was composed of commer-
cial firms whose goods were destroyed in a fire which they claim had its
origin in the defective wiring. It was precisely because of the identity
of proof to be presented by the various plaintiffs on the issues of negli-
gence, proximate causation and defenses to liability that the action
was allowed to proceed on a class basis.
It should be pointed out that this action involved a tort which oc-
curred in Illinois, and the action was brought on the basis of diversity
of citizenship. There is a serious question of whether this class action
would have been permitted in an Illinois court because the complaint
asked for only legal relief, and the existence of a common fund could
not be demonstrated.
I agree with Professor Wright, who has stated that "the need for more
efficient methods of disposing of large numbers of cases arising out of
a single disaster has a high priority in improving judicial administra-
tion."50  Hopefully, the Illinois courts will allow a class suit in the mass
47. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,
103 (1966).
48. American Trading and Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D.
155 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
49. Id.
50. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs 313 (2d ed. 1970).
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tort situation where the issues of liability and defenses depend on an
identical set of facts.
Adequacy of Representation
In the landmark case of Hansberry v. Lee,51 the United States Su-
preme Court held due process of law required adequate representation
in all class actions.52 The Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court
and held defendants were not bound by a prior court decree in which
they were absent members of a class because they had not been ade-
quately represented. In other words, absent members are not bound
where their interests are antagonistic to or not wholly compatible with
those of the representative.
Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes it
a prerequisite to a class action that the representative parties "will fairly
and adequately protect the interest of the class."
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,8 the court applied the adequacy of
representation test, stating there must be no collusion between the liti-
gants, and the representative may not have antagonistic interests to the
remainder of the class. Furthermore, the adequacy of the representa-
tion must be determined by a qualitative rather than a quantitative test
because if class suits could only be maintained where a majority of the
class appeared, the class action procedure would be severely curtailed.
The ability of the attorney or attorneys for the class may be raised as
part of the issue of adequate representation. This view was expressed
by the court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:
To be sure, an essential concomitant of adequate representation
is that the party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally
able to conduct the proposed litigation. 54
Any attack upon the competency of the lawyer for the class may be
strategically disastrous unless the incompetence charged is specific, sup-
ported by solid evidence, and so apparent as to be obvious. Other-
wise, the court may give a solid endorsement of counsel's ability.55
Several suits have been dismissed in Illinois because of a conflict of
interest between the plaintiffs and other members of the class.56 Fur-
51. 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
52. See Comment, 21 BoSTON U.L. REV. 132 (1941); Comment, 26 CORNELL L.Q.
317 (1941).
53. 391 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1968).
54. Id. at 562.
55. Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed. 883 (1972). See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart,
Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. Langson v. Goldberg, 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940); State Life Ins. Co.
v. Board of Education, 394 IlL. 301, 68 N.E.2d 525 (1946).
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thermore, a class judgment obtained without adequate representation is
subject to collateral attack.5 7
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Assuming that the facts warrant the filing of a class action, an attor-
ney must anticipate several problems not common to the customary
lawsuit involving one plaintiff.
One of the first procedural problems is the preparation of the com-
plaint. At this stage an attorney will have to analyze the facts to deter-
mine where he can obtain jurisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over
the subject matter and proper venue.
Jurisdiction
Generally a final decision in an Illinois class action is binding upon
all members of the class,58 including class members who are not Illi-
nois residents. 59  However, a constitutional question is raised by this
procedure, i.e., whether a state court having acquired jurisdiction over
parties who reside in the state in which it sits can issue an order which
will bind nonresident members. Due process requires notice to inter-
ested parties sufficient to enable them to appear and be heard,60 and
due process also imposes territorial limitations on a court's jurisdiction
over persons or property."' The interests of a state may enable a state
court to extend its jurisdiction over individuals who are beyond its terri-
torial limits,62 in which case adequate notice is the primary means of
protecting the parties involved.
Although an Illinois court may have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the defendant, the issue is whether the court has power to
bind unnamed class members who are nonresidents and who have not
57. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 Il. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37(1939); Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 I11. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
58. Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 257, 33 N.E. 858 (1893); Newberry Library v.
Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 95, 55 N.E.2d 147, 153 (1944); Reardon v. Ford Motor
Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 341, 287 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (1972).
59. Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951). In Holstein
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 68 Ch. 275 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1970), the Circuit
Court of Cook County entered a judgment in favor of a class composed of residents of 32
different states. In the course of the proceeding, the court rejected a contention that
the law of each state must be applied respectively to the claims of members from that
particular state.
60. Hassall v. Wilcox, 130 U.S. 493 (1889).
61. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878), an early case concerning territorial
limitations which has been distinguished in many other cases. For relatively recent
cases, compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), with Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1971); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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been given notice of the suit. The Illinois courts are reluctant to per-
mit a class action under these circumstances. In Reardon v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., three plaintiffs, the owners of Ford automobiles, filed a com-
plaint on behalf of all owners of Ford and Mercury automobiles of the
model years 1965 through 1969 and owners of 1968 and 1969 Thunder-
bird automobiles (a class of approximately 4,000,000 individuals located
throughout the U.S.). There was an allegation that the front wheel
mechanism was defective. The court refused to allow a class action
and pointed out:
Three individuals all from the State of Illinois attempt to "stand
in judgment" for approximately 4,000,000 other individuals lo-
cated in every state in the union. Procedural questions, eviden-
tiary questions, and various defenses such as the statute of limi-
tations vary from State to State. We do not believe that three
plaintiffs all from the same State should be permitted to "stand
in judgment" for 4,000,000 other individuals who may well desire
to seek their own redress against the defendant. 3
Although the jurisdictional question was not faced squarely in Rear-
don, there are at least two arguments in favor of jurisdiction. When
the Illinois courts are confronted with a class action involving non-
residents who are not notified, it can be argued that there is jurisdiction
over the nonresident members on the theory that the representatives
in court are for all purposes agents of the nonresident absentee mem-
bers. 4
Furthermore, a court could treat the "common fund" within Ii-
nois as a res and exercise in rem jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in
Hansberry v. Lee indicated in dicta that upon a full and fair considera-
tion of the common question a state court could constitutionally bind
nonresident members of a class. 65
Federal Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction is an alternative to state jurisdiction and should
not be overlooked by an Illinois attorney. If federal jurisdiction can
be obtained, a class action may be available even if Illinois courts would
not allow it.66
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and facts creating jurisdic-
tion must be present. The two basic types of federal jurisdiction are
63. 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 344, 287 N.E.2d 519, 524 (1972).
64. Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1958); St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v.
Meyer, 364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249 (1954).
65. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
66. Edgerton v. Aroi6ur & Co.,.94 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
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federal question and diversity of citizenship."' Under diversity juris-
diction, state created rights may be enforced since Illinois substantive
law applies.68 However, as will be pointed out later, the instances in
which a state created right can be enforced through a class action in fed-
eral court are extremely limited.
Two important questions must be considered at the threshold of div-
ersity jurisdiction. First, is there complete diversity of citizenship?
Second, does the amount in controversy exceed $10,000 exclusive of
interest and costs? Diversity jurisdiction requires that no plaintiff be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant.6" In class actions the rule is
that only the citizenship of the named parties is considered in deter-
mining whether diversity exists. 70  By a careful selection of the named
plaintiffs it is possible to satisfy the requirement of complete diversity
of parties.
The second question is whether the individual claims of the class
members can be aggregated for the purpose of exceeding the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement.7 1  The amount alleged in the com-
plaint is determinative unless it was not made in good faith or recovery
of the amount alleged is a legal impossibility. If the claims are joint
or common, they may, of course, be aggregated. However, if the indi-
vidual parties have several and separate interests even though they arise
out of the same transaction, the claims cannot be added together to
reach the jurisdictional amount.7 2  Generally, Rule 23(b)(3) covers
factual situations involving several and separate interests.
The affirmation of the rule against aggregation, as a practical matter,
emasculated the utility of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in claims based upon state statutes or common law principles,
and restricted the ultilization of the class action, in effect, to federal
question claims. A recent case further limited 23(b) (3) class ac-
tions to the narrow situation in which all class members meet the
$10,000 requirement.73
In Zahn v. International Paper Company, the Second Circuit United
States Court of Appeals required that all plaintiffs, named and un-
67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1301-92 (1970).
68. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1939); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806).
70. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 372 (1970).
72. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Waterman, 106 U.S. 265 (1882); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) does not allow aggregation of claims.
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named, meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount."4 Therefore, under
Zahn, a diversity action will not be allowed to proceed as a class ac-
tion when the named members meet the jurisdictional amount but the un-
named members do not. The plaintiffs in Zahn successfully petitioned
for a wirt of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 75
If the United States Supreme Court affirms this decision, consumer
class actions based on diversity of citizenship will be all but eliminated.
It will be extremely rare for all members of a class who meet the juris-
dictional requirements and the other requirements of Rule 23 to have
a claim in excess of $10,000. Furthermore, if they do, they will prob-
ably employ separate counsel to pursue their rights and file individual
suits.
In addition, if Zahn is affirmed, it will be impossible for plaintiffs
counsel to allege in good faith that each member of the class has a claim
in excess of $10,000 when, in all likelihood, neither counsel nor the
named plaintiffs would have sufficient knowledge to make such an al-
legation. They would not know each member of the class nor the
amount of his claim. Furthermore, if such a good faith claim is made,
the trial court may disregard it as a legal impossibility, as the lower
court did in Zahn.71
In federal question cases the amount in controversy must exceed
$10,000, and the Zahn case is equally applicable. However, it should
be pointed out that there are a number of special jurisdictional statutes
which are available without regard to citizenship or the amount in con-
troversy, including but not limited to antitrust, 77 securities, 78 civil
rights, 79 collective bargaining," and truth-in-lending. 81  Therefore, if
the case arises under a federal statute, an attorney should search the
special jurisdictional provisions of federal law.
Venue
In Illinois every action must be commenced in the county where any
defendant who is joined in good faith resides, or the country where the
cause of action arose. 82 A private corporation is a resident of the
74. 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted,- U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973).
See also Note, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 852 (1972), which comments on the requirement
that each member of the class must meet the $10,000 requirement.
75. - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973).
76. Zahn v. International Paper Company, 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970); 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1305 (1972).
82. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 5 (1971).
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county where it has a registered office or other office or is doing busi-
ness.88 Therefore, venue for the class action is the same as for all
other actions in Illinois since the residence of the named representative
is not considered. Choice of the named representative will not be a
factor in proper venue.
If federal jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, suit may
be brought "only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all de-
fendants reside, or in which the claim arose."'8 4  If jurisdiction is based
on the presence of a federal question, the suit must be brought in the
judicial district "where all defendants reside, or in which the claim
arose."85  For purposes of venue a "corporation may be sued in any
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or
is doing business." 86
Residence of the plaintiffs is considered in federal class actions based
on diversity of citizenship. Therefore, in diversity cases suit may be
brought in any of several judicial districts. However, this is not possible
in federal question suits because the residence of the plaintiffs is of no
consequence. The residence of only the named parties is considered in
applying the federal venue laws.87
Should the Complaint Be Filed In Chancery Or In Law?
The use of the class action is truly equitable.8 8  It has developed in
equity courts in Illinois, and at least one author states that "the use
of the class representation technique is limited to courts of equity
• . there can be no class or representation suits in a law action."89
Many cases have held that a class action is limited to courts of equity
in Illinois."° This rule raises several problems for an Illinois lawyer
which need elaboration.
The Illinois Civil Practice Act is applicable to all civil proceedings
both at law and equity, but as to all "matters not regulated by statute or
rule of court, the practice at common law and in equity prevails."'"
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 6 (1971).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1970).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
87. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Local No. 612, 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
88. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS 102 (10th ed. 1891); Comment, 4 J. MARSHALL
J. PRAC. AND PROCED. 217, 220 (1971).
89. Fox, Representative Actions and Proceedings, 1954 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 94,
97-98.
90. Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 Ill. App. 191, 106 N.E.2d 735 (1952); People ex
rel Aramburu v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill. App. 2d 184, 219 N.E.2d 548 (1966); Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Schreiber, 382 Ill. 454, 47 N.E.2d 462 (1943); Moseid v. Mc-
Donough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 1 (1971).
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Furthermore, the 1964 Judicial Article eliminated the legal and
equitable sides of the Illinois Circuit Courts for jurisdictional purposes.
The merger of law and equity applies to procedure but does not destroy
the differences between substantive common law and equity.92 There-
fore, a judge must still apply equitable principles to equitable rights and
legal principles to legal rights.
For a court of equity to exercise jurisdiction, the relief requested
must be equitable in character and the remedy at law must be inade-
quate. Will a court of equity take jurisdiction of a class action com-
plaint which prays for money damages? Illinois courts have held that a
class action based on fraud, seeking only damages, is a case at law and
will not lie.9 3 Of course, if a court of equity has taken jurisdiction over
equitable matters, it may grant relief which is incidental to other mat-
ters before it in order to do complete justice between the parties.94
For example, damages may be granted as an incident to the grant-
ing of relief of an injunction.95 Therefore, plaintiff's attorney may in-
clude a request for money damages as long as it is incidental to the
equitable relief. Private attorneys, in general, are unwilling to prose-
cute a class action complaint praying solely for injunctive relief be-
cause even if injunctive relief is granted there would be no fund to pay
attorney's fees.
Before leaving this rule, however, it should be noted that Federal
Rule 23 is applicable to actions solely for damages. Therefore, if
all jurisdictional requirements can be met, an attorney can resort to the
federal court and request only legal relief.
The equity courts possess possibilities which should not be overlooked.
For example, temporary and permanent injunctive relief will prevent
future damage to all named and unnamed plaintiffs. The temporary
injunction is important because the consumer needs relief immediately.
The final outcome of the lawsuit could be many years in coming. A
preliminary injunction can be obtained in Illinois, but the defendant
will petition the court to require the plaintiff to provide a bond to se-
cure the defendant against any damages he may incur. If the bond is
92. O'Shaughnessy, Suits in Equity Contrasted with Actions at Law, 1954 U. ILL.
LAw FORUM 1.
93. Illinois Minerals Co. v. Miller, 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N.E.2d 44 (1946); Lowen-
thai Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 259 IlL App. 612 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 351 Ill. 285, 184 N.E. 310 (1932); Utterback v. Estill, 224 IIl. App. 151(1922); Bottigliero v. Zeidman, 205 Il. App. 587 (1917); Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth,
375 Il1. 536, 31 N.E.2d 944 (1941).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 135(a) (1971).
95. Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorp., 280 Il. App. 151 (1935); Langson v.
Goldberg, 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940). See Comment, 4 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc.
AND PRocED. 217, 222 (1971).
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required, it creates problems for the plaintiff's attorney. To a low-in-
come consumer the cost of the bond may be beyond his means, or the
risks inherent in filing a bond may be rejected by the named plaintiffs.
In Illinois the requirement of a bond prior to the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of
the court.9"
Another bonus available in equity courts is that they have great
flexibility in tailoring their remedy to the need of particular circum-
stances. In addition, the enforcement techniques operate to coerce
compliance by acting on the person of the wrongdoer and that is likely
to be effective.97
Special problems relating to pleading and jury trial in courts of equity
will be treated subsequently.
Notification of Pendency of the Action
No Illinois cases were found which require notice to the class of the
pendency of the suit prior to determination of the issues. If required
at all, it is only necessary in a settlement or dismissal situation.9"
However, some question is raised concerning the constitutionality of
a failure to notify the class of the pendency of the action. 9  Although
not strictly a class action, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,1°° an action by a trustee for judicial settlement of the trustee's
accounts, it was held that notice by publication to the beneficiaries was
not sufficient as to those beneficiaries whose names and addresses were
known to the trustee. The Court held:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections. [Emphasis added.]
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"' the Second Circuit United
States Court of Appeals, quoting Mullane, held that:
Notice, as an integral part of due process must be "reasonably
calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections."
96. ILL. REV. STiAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971).
97. See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1: Considerations of Equity, 49
BosToN U.L. REv. 211 (1969).
98. ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1971).
99. Comment, 4CRIGHroN L. R1v. 268 (1971).
100. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
101. 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
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However, there is some support for the Illinois rule in Northern Nat-
urat Gas Co. v. Grounds,10 2 where the court quoted from Dolgow v.
Anderson:
The Supreme Court has indicated that adequacy of representa-
tion, not form of notice, is the crucial consideration. See Hans-
berry v. Lee . . . ("this Court is justified in saying that there has
been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot
be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection
of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.")103
If notice is required it should be the best notice practicable under
the circumstances.' Even though it may be argued that notice of the
pendency of the action is not required to bind absent class members,
proper notice will greatly strengthen the defendant's argument that the
absentee is bound by an adverse judgment.
Eisen 111105 is a significant case in this regard. There, an antitrust
class action was filed against the New York Stock Exchange and major
odd-lot dealers claiming that the odd-lot differential was excessive.
The class consisted of some six million odd-lot investors. The trial
court ordered that actual notice be given to those persons who had 10
or more odd-lot transactions (some 2,000 persons) and notice would
be sent to 5,000 additional class members selected at random. The
Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals rejected that formula
and required that actual notice be given all identifiable class members.
At least 2,250,000 could be identified and they resided in every state
of the United States and most foreign countries.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari and the
case is pending at the time of this writing. 10 6 If the Supreme Court
affirms the decision on constitutional grounds, it will control the require-
ment of notice in Illinois class actions.
Who Pays for the Cost of Notification?
If notice is held to be a constitutional requisite, the question of who
does it and who pays for it arises. This is a much more important ques-
tion than it would appear at first blush. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(Eisen III), the court stated:
If identification of any number of members of the class can readily
102. 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968).
103. (emphasis supplied) 43 F.R.D. 472, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
104. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
105. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir. May
1, 1973).
106. 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
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be made, individual notice to these members must be given
and Eisen, the plaintiff, must pay the cost. If this cannot be done,
the case must be dismissed as a class action.10 7
In that case the names and addresses of approximately 2,250,000
class members were available. Members of the class resided in every
state of the United States and most foreign countries. The cost of noti-
fication would have been enormous. The trial court required the de-
fendant to pay 90% of the cost of notice to selected members of the
class. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the decision and required actual notice to all identifiable mem-
bers of the class. Furthermore, the plaintiff was required to pay the
cost of notice or obtain a bond to cover the cost of notice.
In short, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the cost of actual notice
to all identifiable members of the class. They were unable to do so
and, therefore, the case was dismissed. As noted above, the United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
Pursuant to Eisen III the cost of providing notice to the class could
be taxed as a cost after judgment is rendered. In most cases the defen-
dant will be able to afford the cost of notice to the class members. If the
suit is won by the plaintiffs, no adjustment will be necessary. However,
if defendant prevails, it will have a right to recover the cost of notice as
a taxable cost. If the plaintiff is financially unable to pay the cost, the
defendant will have a right without a remedy. Therefore, the court may
require the plaintiff to pay the cost of notice or post a bond to cover the
cost of notice if the defendant is victorious.
As in Eisen III, the cost of the bond may be beyond the means of
the named representative, and therefore such a requirement will place
the class action beyond his reach. It may be argued that such a re-
quirement violates the equal protection clause as an invidious dis-
crimination between rich and poor.
Necessary Allegations In Class Suits
In Illinois the general rules of pleading govern class suits. The com-
plaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the cause of ac-
tion' 0 8 and should affirmatively allege facts which indicate that the
representative party has a right to maintain the class action and that he
filed the action on behalf of all members of the class described in the
107. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir. May
1, 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 33(1) (1971).
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pleading.1"9 Particular attention should be given to the amount or re-
lief prayed for in the complaint because the action is brought on behalf
of all plaintiffs in the class.
The caption should contain the language "John Doe, individually,
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated." The body of
the complaint should include the same allegations.
Other allegations which should be included in the complaint are the
following:
1. That no adequate remedy at law exists;
2. That the issues present common questions of law and fact
between the named plaintiff and other members of the class;
3. That if individual actions were required to be brought by
each class plaintiff, a multiplicity of suits would result, causing
a great hardship to the defendant, the parties and the courts;
4. That it is impractical to join all parties;
5. That a common fund exists (in cases requesting a monetary
recovery).
Of course, as previously pointed out, the mere designation by the
pleader of his cause of action as a class suit does not make it a class
suit. The court will examine the facts to ascertain whether it in fact
properly constitutes a class suit. 10°
Preliminary Hearing to Determine Propriety of Class Proceeding
Whether or not orders of the court will bind absentee members of
the class should be determined at an early stage of the proceedings.
Ordinarily the defendant will file a motion to dismiss the class action,
but if defendant does not take such action, the court on its own mo-
tion should raise the issue. If the court allows the class action, all
future proceedings bind the members of the class. If the court refuses
the class action, the named plaintiffs may proceed or may attempt to
appeal the order.
Appealability of an Order Denying Class Suit Treatment
Under traditional analysis an order denying class suit treatment is
merely interlocutory and not appealable because it is not final. The
representative would either dismiss the suit or proceed on his individual
claim to final judgment and then appeal. However, it could be argued
109. Southerland v. Copeland, 350 Ill. App. 313, 112 N.E.2d 733 (1953); Oppen-
heimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
110. South East National Bank v. Board of Education, 298 Ill. App. 621, 18 N.E.
2d 584 (1938).
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that the order dismissing the class action operates as the dismissal of a
claim as to one party. Therefore, treating the class as a different party
from the representative, the order is appealable under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 304(a) if the trial court will make an express written find-
ing that there is no just reason for delaying appeal."1  Such an order
is within the discretion of the trial judge."'
Rule 304(a) provides that if the court enters a final order as to one
or more but fewer than all the parties and in addition makes an express
written finding that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal, the
order may be immediately appealed. In the absence of such a finding,
any judgment that adjudicates the claims of fewer than all the parties
is not appealable.
Another possible authority for an immediate appeal from an order
dismissing a class action is Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a). Un-
der this rule the trial court must state in writing that the order involves
a question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference
of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the order may mater-
ially advance the ultimate termination of the litagation. If the trial
court makes this determination, permission to appeal is within the dis-
cretion of the appellate court.
Yet another possibility for obtaining an appeal from such an order
is to argue that the Illinois courts should adopt the "death knell"
doctrine applied by the Second Circuit United States Court of Ap-
peals. 113  This doctrine is based on the fact that the denial of class
treatment in effect strikes the "death knell" of the action since the dollar
amount of the named plaintiffs' claim will not justify further proceed-
ings. 14  There is a division among the federal circuits concerning the
"death knell" theory of appealability. 1 '5 Furthermore, many trouble-
some problems arise in applying the doctrine, including a determina-
tion of the minimum amount in controversy which would sound the
"death knell."
Assuming immediate appellate review is not allowed, the named
plaintiffs are unlikely to continue with the action if their monetary in-
terest is not sufficient to justify it. Then the propriety of the trial
court's ruling on the class action will never be reviewed. As a result
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 304(a) (1971).
112. Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck, 5 Ill. App. 3d 50, 282 N.E.2d 524
(1972).
113. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966); Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
114. Note, 39 U. C i. L. REV. 403 (1972).
115. The Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals does not accept the "death knell"
doctrine. Hackett v. General Host. Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
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the class members will be deprived not only of the opportunity to pre-
sent their claims but of the opportunity to argue to the appellate court
that they meet the standards for class actions in Illinois.
Statute of Limitations
The application of the statute of limitations to class actions may raise
troublesome problems. Assume that a class action is filed just prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations. After it has expired, the
court determines that the class action is improper and that the named
plaintiff may only bring the action on his own behalf. X, a member of
the class, subsequently files a complaint or attempts to intervene in
the original action. The defendant files a motion to dismiss under
Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act'16 alleging that the claim is barred
because it was not commenced within the time allowed by law. This
factual situation raises several issues.
Since the action is filed in chancery, statutes of limitations applicable
to actions at law are not strictly applied."17  However, limitations fixed
by statute usually are followed by chancery as a convenient measure for
determining the length of time which ought to operate as a bar where
there is a corresponding legal right or remedy."" Therefore, where a
portion of the relief requested is legal, the courts will apply the sta-
tute of limitations applicable to the particular legal right. The limita-
tions period for a class action would thus depend upon the underlying
theory of the claim. For example, an action for a breach of an oral
contract would be five years, 119 while a personal injury action is two
years.1 20
In Illinois, the statute dealing with limitations on personal actions
is applicable to a suit which is dismissed other than on the merits after
the time for commencing the action has expired. The statute provides
in pertinent part as follows:
In the actions specified in this Act or any other act or contract
where the time for commencing an action is limited .... if the
plaintiff is nonsuited, or the action is dismissed for want of prose-
cution then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such
116. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 110, § 48 (1971).
117. Bremer v. Bremer, 411 Ill. 454, 104 N.E.2d 299 (1952); McDiarmid v. Mc-
Diarmid, 368 Ill. 638, 15 N.E.2d 493 (1938); Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500, 149
N.E. 495 (1925).
118. Kriegel v. Miedema, 20 Ill. App. 2d 235, 155 N.E.2d 815 (1959); Wall v.
Chicago Park District, 378 Ill. 81, 37 N.E.2d 752 (1941); Gillett v. Wiley, 126 Ill.
310, 19 N.E. 287 (1888).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1971).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1971).
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an action expires during the pendency of such suit, the plaintiff
. . . may commence a new action within one year or within the
remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, ... after
the plaintiff is nonsuited or the action is dismissed for want of
prosecution.' 2 l
The purpose of this section is to promote fair play and provide decisions
upon the merits of the controversy. 2 2 The word "nonsuit" as employed
in the statute, therefore, applies to all involuntary judgments leaving
the merits untouched. 2 ' Of course, if a new suit is filed, it must be
based on the same cause of action. 124
Therefore, if a class action is dismissed after the limitations period
has expired, a member of the class could arguably file his individual ac-
tion within one year of the dismissal relying upon the section quoted
above. After all, his action was "nonsuited," the decision was not
upon the merits, and the new suit is based on the same cause of action.
However, the defendant could argue that class members who had
no knowledge of the class suit cannot claim they vicariously filed suit
and were nonsuited. He could argue that they are barred because the
purpose of the statute is to protect those plaintiffs who actually filed
suit and were deprived of a trial on the merits. The absentee mem-
bers did not know of the suit, and if it had not been filed, they would
have been barred by the limitations period. They should thus be
barred as though no suit in their interest had ever been filed.
Those members of the class who had notice of the claim within the
limitations period would argue that they reasonably relied upon the fil-
ing of the class action to protect their rights, intending to be bound by
the results in such action.' 25
No Illinois case directly in point has been found, but a recent federal
case dealt with this issue.' 2 6 There, the court indicated it would allow
members of the class an opportunity to present proof of reliance upon
the pendency of the purported class action sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations. This would be allowed if the reason for the negative de-
termination arose because of "housekeeping" considerations. How-
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24a (1971).
122. In re Estate of Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 251 N.E.2d 910 (1969); Roth
v. Northern Assur. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 415 (1964).
123. 25 I.L.P. Limitations § 121 at p. 300 (1956); Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 131 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1942).
124. Gibbs v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 79 Il. App. 22 (1898); Butterman v.
Steiner, 343 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1965).
125. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,
104 (1966); Comment, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 382-90 (1968); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.90[3] (2d ed. 1969).
126. Philadelphia Electiic Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461(E.D. Pa. 1968).
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ever, if the reason stated by the court for refusal of the class action was
that common questions did not predominate over individual questions,
no member of the class would be allowed to file a subsequent action.
In my opinion the reason given by the court in denying the class
action is not relevant to a determination of whether or not to allow
claims after the statute of limitations has expired. It only creates an
additional complication in the administration of class actions. For
example, what would happen if the court gave a number of different
reasons, or none at all, for denial of the class action? The statute
should be tolled during the pendency of the class action for those
members who relied upon the filing of the class action. To rule other-
wise might be a denial of due process of law.
Suits by Class Members While Class Action Is Pending
In Illinois there is precedent to dismiss127 or enjoin 128 a private suit
by an unnamed member while the class action is pending. The pur-
pose of this rule is to protect the defendant and the judicial system
from a multiplicity of suits. However, the rule is not applicable to in-
tervention.
Intervention by Class Members
Class members may file a petition to intervene as complainants at
any time before the cause is finally determined. 29  Section 26.1(1)(b)
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act allows intervention as a matter of right
"when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties
is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or may be bound by a
judgment, decree or order in the action." However, an unnamed mem-
ber of the class will have to argue that the representative is not ade-
quately protecting his interests, because the representative has a differ-
ent or adverse interest. Of course, such an argument would be an at-
tack on the propriety of the class action since a class action judgment
without adequate representation is subject to collateral attack.8 0
In Fiorito v. Jones,'3' the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court ruling which refused a petition by an unnamed member of the
class to intervene under Section 26.1(1)(b) because the petitioner
127. Leonard v. Bye, 361 IU1. 185, 197 N.E. 546 (1935).
128. Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 111. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
129. Lee v. City of Casey, 269 Ill. 604, 109 N.E. 1062 (1915).
130. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), rev'g 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37
(1939); Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
131. 45 IH. 2d 15, 256 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
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could not show that the representation was inadequate. In most cases
petitioners will not be able to meet this burden and the petition will be
denied. If they do meet the burden the class action may be dismissed.
Section 26.1 (1) (c) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act allows interven-
tion as a matter of right when the applicant will be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property subject to the con-
trol of the court.1 32
A class member could argue that he has a "right" to intervene under
that section if the court has a "common fund" subject to its control and
the class member could be adversely affected by a distribution of the
property. However, the defendant could reply that the intervenor is
already an unnamed party and the attorney for the class represents
him. In my opinion the court will not allow intervention under this
section.
Section 26.1(2)(b) provides that an applicant may in the discretion
of the court be permitted to intervene when an applicant's claim and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common. Of course,
if the class action is allowed, the applicant must have a question of fact
and law in common with the claim made by the representative. How-
ever, the court is not likely to grant the petition because it would add
to the complexity and create additional problems in management of
the class, which in all likelihood is already difficult.
If the court allows intervention, whether discretionary or as a matter of
right, the court may determine that the applicant shall be bound by prior
orders and shall not interfere with the control of the litigation.' In
many cases, of course, such an order is advisable to avoid undue delay
and to maintain orderly discovery and trial.
Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment
The Illinois law governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action13 and motion for summary judgment.3 5 is applicable
to a class action. Where the named plaintiffs have no individual cause
of action any attempted class action must fail.
The defendant is likely to use a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment to dispose of the suit at an early stage without a
trial. Indeed these procedural devices are the answer to the critics who
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.1(1)(c) (1971).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch- 110, § 26.1(6) (1971).
134. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, § 45 (1971); James v. First Federal Savings and
Loan Ass'n of Berwyn, 11 Ill. App. 3d 631, 297 N.E.2d 255 (1973).
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (1971).
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contend class actions encourage a frivolous claim to be filed against a
large wealthy corporate defendant in hope that the named plaintiffs
can obain a settlement because of the enormous risk exposure. If
the defendant cannot sustain the motion to dismiss nor the summary
judgment, sympathy for the defendant is eroded because the court has
found that the complaint states a cause of action and that there is a
genuine issue of material fact to be tried.
In addition, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff lacks the capacity to maintain a class suit.136 The al-
leged lack of legal capacity must be determined from the face of the
pleadings and affidavits filed under Section 48 of the Civil Practice
Act. 137
Discovery
Class members having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court can
be required to submit to discovery, which may involve a good deal of
work by class members. Therefore, the timing and extent of discovery
from absent class members may be a contested issue in the case. 1as
If the discovery is justified and not complied with, the sanctions may be
severe. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,'" the
court dismissed claims of members of the class who refused to pro-
duce requested documents and to answer interrogatories. 40
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c). 4 would appear to be appli-
cable to absent class members and to allow dismissal of the action
for non-compliance with any discovery order. However, counsel for the
defendant should be required to show that the information is required
for preparation for trial and that the discovery devices are not used to
take unfair advantage of absent class members. Subjecting absent
class members to discovery has been considered improper by some fed-
eral courts.
1 42
Pre-Trial Procedure
The trial will consist of numerous problems, including the procedure
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 48 (1971).
137. Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 I11. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952).
138. State of Illinois v. Harper & Rowe Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); cf. Korn v. Franchard, 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
139. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971).
140. See also Note, 21 J. PUB. LAw 189 (1972); Annot., 13 A.L.R. Fed. 255
(1972); Note, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (1972).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 219(c) (1971).
142. Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 15 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 905 (D. Ky. 1971); Wain-
wright v. Kraftco Corp., 15 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1333 (D. Ga. 1972); Bucalo v. Gen-
eral Leisure Products Corp., 15 FED. RULES SERv. 2d 564 (S.DN.Y. 1971).
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for joint determination of common questions of law and fact followed
by individual hearings as to the damages of each class member. Such
a procedure may be worked out in the pre-trial conferences between
court and counsel. 143
The pre-trial conference in a class action should simplify the issues
of law and fact before the court and provide a procedure for separate
determination of liability and damages. The court may notify absent
class members of the results of the pre-trial conference and require
them to accept the procedure determined in the pre-trial conference or
to opt out of the class and maintain their own action.
Settlement
Section 52.1 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act provides that a class
action shall not be "compromised or dismissed except with the ap-
proval of the court and, unless excused for good cause shown, upon
notice as the court may direct."' 44  This is the only statutory provision
directly relating to Illinois class actions. It was adopted to insure judi-
cial control over class action settlements and to prevent collusion be-
tween the named plaintiffs and defendant. Prior to the adoption
of Section 52.1, plaintiffs could force the large corporate defendant into
a settlement with only the named plaintiffs. The case would be dis-
missed and that would be the end of it. No court approval was re-
quired.
Under current procedure the court should require the parties to dis-
close such matters as the total dollar amount of the settlement, the
allocation of the settlement among different classes or sub-classes, the
plan of distribution to class members and attorney's fees and expenses.
The defendant will seek to avoid notice to the class of a settlement or
compromise with only the named plaintiffs. Any notice will encourage
unnamed class members to file an action on behalf of the class or an in-
dividual action.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require notice to all class
members of any proposed dismissal or compromise,'145 even if there is a
voluntary dismissal'46 or a local court rule permitting dismissal for
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, § 218 (1971).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1971).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides that: "A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs."
146. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e); National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Ass'n. Inc.
v. Philad Co., 4 F.R.D. 106 (D. Del. 1944). See also Dole, The Settlement of Class
Actions for Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 971 (1971).
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lack of prosecution. 47  The purpose is to assure that notice is given
to any person whose rights would be affected by a dismissal or com-
promise. Therefore, notice is not required when the dismissal is in-
voluntary because an involuntary dismissal presumably cannot involve
collusion or benefit the plaintiffs at the expense of the remaining class
members. 48
Should notice be waived if a settlement occurs before there is a deter-
mination that a suit is maintainable as a class action? The matter has
not been decided in Illinois, but it has in the federal courts. Philadel-
phia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co. held that a case
brought as a class action is a class action from the outset. 4 ' It may not
be dismissed or compromised without notice to class members. This rule
prevents a strike suit to obtain a settlement from the defendant prior
to determination of whether or not it is a proper class action.
If a settlement or compromise is entered into, the parties should fol-
low the provisions of Section 52.1 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
A written motion should be presented to the court. Generally the com-
promise or settlement will be bilateral, with all parties appearing,
obviating the necessity of notice of the hearing. The order must pro-
vide for approval of the court and either provide for notice of the settle-
ment to the class or for waiver of such notice. Furthermore, if notice
is waived, the order should provide the reasons for waiver. A mere
statement of waiver "for good cause shown" may not be enough.
Illinois is one of the only states to allow a court to excuse notice to
the absent class members. Since the vast majority of class actions are
disposed of prior to trial by voluntary or involuntary dismissal, the
procedural regulation of dismissals is essential to the proper functioning
of the class action. In my opinion Section 52.1 should be amended to
require notice under all circumstances, including involuntary dismissals.
Trial
The traditional view is that suits involving class actions are equit-
able, and therefore, there is no right to a jury trial. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit United States Court of Appeals recently held that the mer-
147. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324(E.D. Pa. 1967), an attempt to circumvent FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e) by classifying a dis-
missal as a motion to drop one or more parties under Rule 21; Yaffee v. Detroit Steel
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970), where the court refused to allow an amend-
ment under Rule 15(a) to delete class action allegations.
148. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.80[2.1], [3] (2d ed. 1969). For a
criticism of this rule see Comment, 40 U. CI. L. REv. 783 (1973).
149. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see also Yaffee v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50
F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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ger of law and equity allowed the issue of the right to sue in a deriva-
tive action to be decided in equity without a jury, and the substantive
elements of the claim itself to be decided by a jury. 15 0 The United
States Supreme Court has indicated by dicta that class action plaintiffs
may obtain a jury trial on legal issues.151 This reasoning should be
applied in Illinois.
Section 63 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act grants a court discretion
to allow legal issues to be tried by a jury even though the case is pend-
ing in equity. 52 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 232(b) if a court
determines that the legal and equitable issues are severable, the legal
issue must be tried by a jury if a jury has been properly demanded.1"3
Therefore, if a plaintiff's attorney desires a jury, he should file a jury de-
mand with the complaint. If he does not, a jury will be waived.
The bifurcated trial which may result in the separation of the issues
of liability and damages may lead to challenge. Of course, there is no
constitutional restriction against trying different issues to the jury at sep-
arate times. Furthermore, it is not constitutionally required that all of
the issues be presented to the same jury.
Who controls the litigation? If one or more parties have inter-
vened, the question of which attorney shall have control of the litigation,
including the handling of evidence, objections, cross-examination, and
motions must be decided by the court prior to the trial.
Effect of Judgment
Provided that the necessary requisites for a class action have been
met, an absent class member is bound by the result of the case,154
even if the absent class member later attempts to raise new grounds
not considered in the earlier case.' 5 5 Of course, if there is a conflict
of interest between the representative and members of the class, the ac-
tion is subject to collateral attack.15 6 However, it is not enough to al-
lege that some members of the class wish to assert their rights while
others do not. For example, one or more taxpayers of a community,
suing on behalf of all, may challenge the validity of a public expen-
diture. A good many of the taxpayers may prefer that their rights
150. Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 735
(N.D. Iowa), modified, 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942).
151. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 63 (1971).
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 232(b) (1971).
154. Fisher v. Capesius, 369 I11. 598, 17 N.E.2d 563 (1938).
155. Schmidt v. Modern Woodmen of America, 261 I11. App. 276 (1931).
156. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App.
212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
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not be enforced because of their interest in having the expenditure
made. Yet no one doubts the propriety of bringing such a suit as a
class action.1 57
Attorney's Fees
The court in Illinois has the power to grant and determine the amount
of the attorney's fees. Factors which courts consider in awarding attor-
ney's fees to successful plaintiffs in contingent representative litigation
include: the fee contract between the representatives and attorneys; the
economic benefit created for the class; the time, labor and skill required;
the intricacy, novelty and complexity of the issues; the skill and resource-
fulness of opposing counsel; the risks inherent in contingent fee; and the
benefits accruing to the public."' 8
Representative fees in Illinois class actions have been large. Some
examples are as follows: in Ives v. City of Chicago,159 a taxpayers'
class action, the fund created was $811,950.00, fees allowed
$249,957.62; in Holing v. Willis, 6 ' a right to inherit case, the fund
was $145,875.00, fees allowed $48,625.00; in Moseid v. McDon-
ough,'61 a library fee case, the fund was $679,135.00, fees allowed were
$195,000.00.
After a settlement or a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, notifica-
tion must be sent to all of the members of the class. After receiving
notice the members of the class can appear, establish their right to be
included in the class, and prove up their damages. If the class is ordered
to pay the attorney's fees, members of the class can object to the amount
of the fees at that time.
Who Pays the Fees
The general rule in Illinois and other states is that the named party
in an ordinary action, whether winner or loser, pays for the services
of his own counsel, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.' 62
One of the exceptions to the general rule arises in class or representative
suits where persons other than the named parties may be ordered to
pay a portion of the fees.
157. Cook v. Cohn, 25 Ill. App. 2d 330, 166 N.E.2d 614 (1960).
158. Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 1384 (1971).
159. 30 111. 2d 282, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964).
160. 83 Ill. App. 2d 384, 227 N.E.2d 797 (1967).
161. 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
162. Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 1384 (1971); see also Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 902-
03 (1963).
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There are three potential sources of payment for the attorneys of the
class:
(1) The named representatives of the class;
(2) The entire class that benefits from the judgment; and
(3) The losing opponent of the class.
An attorney representing a class is entitled to recover from those with
whom he has a valid contract, in accordance with the particular con-
tract's terms. However, the named representatives are generally ruled
out as a source of recovery for meaningful attorney's fees because class
litigation is generally of long duration and great complexity and attor-
ney's fees are likely to exceed the monetary recovery of the representa-
tives. Furthermore, it would be unjust to allow other members of the
class to accept the benefit of the representatives' attorney without shar-
ing the burden of his fees.
The named representatives may bear all or a portion of attorney's
fees where the litigation is unsuccessful or the remedy sought-an in-
junction or declaratory judgment--does not yield money damages.
Clients and attorneys should recognize these possibilities and provide
for them in a written retainer contract. Of course, many of the written
fee contracts would be based upon a contingent fee except where the
remedy sought is not monetary.
The court, in the exercise of its historic equity jurisdiction, may di-
rect fees to be paid from the fund created for the benefit of the class.6'6
This is the most common source of attorney's fees. However, if the
common fund is used for payment of attorney's fees, the amount of the
plaintiffs recovery will be reduced. Furthermore, in many cases defen-
dants are motivated to protract litigation in the hope that the representa-
tive parties will realize that after payment of attorney's fees based upon
time and expense, the members of the class will receive a very small
recovery.
Although attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs from
an adversary defendant in a class action, 164 courts have allowed recov-
ery of attorney's fees from losing defendants in class actions in excep-
tional circumstances where defendants are engaged in wilful and per-
sistent bad faith tactics. 6 5
163. Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869
(1957); Green v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 326 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1964); Freeman
v. Ryan, 408 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
164. Soffer v. Glickman, 27 Misc. 2d 721, 209 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. CL 1961); Bank
of America Nat. Trust & Say. Assn. v. West End Chemical Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 685,
100 P.2d 318 (1940).
165. Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Dyer
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If the opponent of the successful class action is required to pay all or
a portion of the attorney's fees, in the sound discretion of the court,
the temptation to "outlast" the plaintiff and his attorney would be gone.
In Illinois the court does have the discretion to tax attorney's fees to
the defendant in an appropriate case.
Section 41 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act allows a party to recover
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees if denials are made without rea-
sonable cause and not in good faith and are found to be untrue.166
This section should discourage defendants from protracting litigation
by making bad faith denials in their pleadings.
Of course, as a part of the settlement the parties may agree that the
opponent of the class action will pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees. In
the recent case of Gowdy v. Commonwealth Edison Company,6 7 the
proposed settlement notice indicated that the parties agreed that the de-
fendant would pay the plaintiffs fees. The amount was to be deter-
mined by the court.
CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review of the body of law
governing Illinois class actions. First, the Illinois courts have restric-
tively interpreted class actions at a time when the need for class ac-
tions is increasing. Second, the Illinois legislature or the Supreme
Court should adopt a rule to govern this matter. Third, there are al-
ternatives to the class action which should be considered.
Implicit in the foregoing discussion of class actions is the realization
that the Illinois courts have found themselves in a dilemma created by
the procedural device of class actions. On the one hand the need for
class actions is recognized, but on the other hand the complexity of con-
stitutional and procedural problems makes some class actions unman-
ageable.
The courts and most legislatures recognize the need for the resolu-
tion of multiple-party controversies in one lawsuit. The class suit eli-
minates repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a super-
ior method for obtaining redress. Thus, the class action serves the
goal of achieving judicial economy and justice. As our society has in-
creased in size and become more sophisticated in its business relation-
ships, consumer and conservation groups also have become aware of the
v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969). See Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1384, 1401-
04 (1971).
166. ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 110, § 41 (1971).
167,. No. 70 CH 3254 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1970).
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availability of the class action. As a result of this awareness, class ac-
tions are becoming more common in Illinois and other jurisdictions.
The Illinois courts must adopt a less restrictive view toward the use
of class actions. The need for a forum to handle class actions is evi-
dent as a result of the Snyder and Zahn decisions which have closed
the federal courts to most class actions based on state created rights.
However, courts and attorneys have had difficulty handling the
problems created by class actions which have been reviewed in this
article. In some cases the problems have been so severe that the courts
have decided to term the class action unmanageable and dismiss it.
These problems are particularly evident in Illinois where class actions are
decided on a case-by-case basis, 68 and one Illinois court has indicated
that the law is confusing. 16 9
The failure of Illinois to adopt a statute or Supreme Court Rule to
govern class actions is subject to criticism; prior judicial opinions do not
answer the many unique problems of class actions facing modern-day
attorneys. Therefore, Illinois courts and attorneys are particularly in
need of some definitive guidelines. Since Illinois has codified its major
rules of procedure in the Civil Practice Act, 70 it is a mystery why it
has not so codified the rules concerning class actions. Failure to draft
a statute or Supreme Court Rule results in the continued injustice of
allowing rights to be violated without making available an effective
remedy. The uncertainty of present Illinois law and the possible abuse
of the class action procedure is thereby condoned.
The Illinois legislature or Supreme Court should act in this area,
drawing upon the experience of Federal Rule 23 and statutes of other
state jursidictions.1 71 Perhaps Illinois should formulate alternatives
to multiple party litigation, such as joinder, intervention, consolidation
and use of the test case. However, those particular devices have been
considered by other courts and found unacceptable.
172
There are further alternatives to class actions which should be ex-
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 1 et seq. (1971).
169. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731
(1962)..
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 1 et seq. (1971).
171. There are four basic treatments of class actions: (1) the common law (Illi-
nois); (2) the 1948 Field Code (New York and California); (3) the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Michigan); (4) the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (e.g., Arizona). See Comment, 4 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. AND PROCED.
218 (1971). For a survey of the variations in each state jurisdiction see Starrs, The
Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 BOSTON U. L. REV.
407 (1969).
172. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Vasquez v. Su-
perior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
,1974
Loyola University Law Journal
plored. For example, Judge Medina's opinion in Eisen III contained
dicta of some significance:
The procedure involved in applying for prospective injunctive re-
lief is relatively simple and inexpensive, social and economic re-
forms may be implemented and an end put to illegal practices with
far more benefit to the community than that derived from minimal
or token payments to individual members of a class. Attorney
fees in such cases should also provide adequate incentive to coun-
sel for the representative or representatives of the class. 173
This statement was derived from a comment by Chief Judge Friendly
criticizing present class action procedure:
Something seems to have gone radically wrong with a well-inten-
tioned effort. Of course, an injured plaintiff should be compen-
sated, but the federal judicial system is not adapted to affording
compensation to classes of hundreds of people with $10 or even
$50 claims. The important thing is to stop the evil conduct. For
this an injunction is the appropriate remedy, and an attorney who
obtains one should be properly compensated by the defendant,
although not in the astronomical terms fixed when there is a
multi-million dollar settlement. If it be said that this still leaves
the defendant with the fruits of past wrong-doing, consideration
might be given to civil fines, payable to the government, suffi-
ciently substantial to discourage engaging in such conduct but not
so colossal as to produce recoveries that would ruin innocent
stockholders or, what is more likely, produce blackmail settle-
ments. This is a matter that needs urgent attention.17 4
Hopefully, the foregoing discussion of class actions will direct the
efforts of the Illinois legislature and the Illinois Supreme Court toward
constructive reform of the law governing class actions or the development
of acceptable alternatives to class actions as we presently know them.
Author's note:
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Zahn v. International Paper Company, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec.
17, 1973). In a six to three decision written by Mr. Justice White, the Court, in
effect, held that each individual plaintiff's claim in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must
satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement. Any plaintiff, named or unnamed, whose
claim does not do so will be dismissed from the case. The Zahn decision will increase
pressure on the state courts to provide forums for recovery in multiple party claims.
See text accompanying notes 73 through 76, supra.
173. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir.
May 1, 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
174. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - F.2d -, -, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir.
May 1, 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
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